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Assessing a Decade of Interstate Bank Branching 
Christian A. Johnson and Tara Rice 
 
 
“One aspect of the American banking system that quickly impresses itself on the mind of a foreign 
observer is its fragmented structure. . . . . [The] prospective developments in the payments mechanism – 
electronic transfer of funds, direct deposit of payrolls, and wider use of pre-authorized credit – will 
reduce the need for customers to visit their banks frequently and, though not resolving the branching 
controversy, will make it academic.”
1 
        
 
I.   Introduction  
While much has changed in the last 33 years, bank branching has not yet progressed from a 
controversial issue to a purely academic one.  Through its history, US banking regulation constrained 
bank growth through prohibitions or restrictions on the means of direct and indirect bank expansion both 
within states (termed intrastate banking and branching) and between states (interstate banking and 
branching).
2  Although restrictions on intrastate expansion were eliminated through piecemeal changes in 
legislation over the past several decades, many restrictions remained with regard to interstate expansion.   
The passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 
1994
3 removed remaining federal restrictions on interstate expansion, but allowed the states considerable 
leeway in deciding the rules governing entry by out-of-state branches.
4  As a result, states that were 
opposed to entry used IBBEA to erect barriers to out-of-state branch entry.   
IBBEA’s removal of Federal interstate branching barriers has resulted in staggering interstate 
expansion.  This growth, illustrated in Figure 1, was driven both by consolidation of bank subsidiaries 
into branch offices and also establishment of de novo branches.  In 1994, 62 out-of-state branches existed 
                                                           
1 Larry Mote,   “The Perennial Issue: Branch Banking.”  Business Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 3-
23, (February 1974).    
2  Means of geographic expansion are: (1) interstate banking (acquiring or establishing a charter in a state outside the 
main bank's home state), (2) interstate branching (acquiring or establishing a branch office, an office which is not 
separately chartered or capitalized, in a state outside the main bank's home state), (3) intrastate banking (acquiring or 
establishing a charter within the main bank's home state) and (4) intrastate branching (acquiring or establishing a 
branch office within the main bank's home state).    
3  Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in 12 U.S.C.). 
4  Passage of IBBEA ignited a small flurry of commentary about the Act.  See Indick, Murray A. & Satish M. Kini, 
The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act:  New Options, New Problems, 112 Banking L.J. 100 (1995); 
Mulloy, Patrick and Cynthia Lasker,  The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: 
Responding to Global Competition,  21 J. LEGIS 255 (1995). Rollinger, Mark D., Interstate Banking and Branching 
Under the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183 (1996); Stritzel, Stacey, Note: The Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Progress Toward A New Era in Financial Services 
Regulation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161 (1995); Tart, Charlotte L., Expansion of the Banking Industry Under the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Is the Banking Industry Headed in the Right 
Direction?,  30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1995).   3
in a small number of states.  By 2005, the number of out-of-state branches had grown to 24,728 or 40 
percent of all domestic branches.
 5    The number of de novo branches increased rapidly as well.  Over our 
sample period, 6,071 de novo out-of-state branches were started; that is, of the 15,296 total commercial 
bank branch increase between 1994 and 2005, 39 percent of those were out-of-state de novo branches.   
An examination of the impact of IBBEA and the effect of the state restrictions and limitations that 
could be imposed on interstate branching is particularly topical today.  Banks recognize the state 
anticompetitive regulatory burden permitted by IBBEA and have pressed agencies and Congress to 
streamline banking law.  A section contained in the “Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act”
6 (which 
was supported by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) as passed by the House in 2006 
would have eliminated remaining interstate branching barriers.  As described in testimony before the U.S. 
Senate by Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn, the interstate branching provisions originally 
contained in the Act would remove the “last obstacle to full interstate branching for banks and level the 
playing field between banks and thrifts.”
 7  Although the final bill did not contain these provisions, the 
issue is sure to be revisited in future bills and legislation. 
Despite the recent growth in out-of-state branches, this article provides evidence that barriers to 
out-of-state entry through branch banking still exist for commercial banks in the United States.  Based 
upon our empirical analysis, covering all 50 states plus the District of Columbia over 11 years, we find 
certain state restrictions permitted by IBBEA to be associated with limited out-of-state branch growth in 
some states.   
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section II provides historical background on 
the bank branching history in the United States.  Section III details the changes in interstate branching law 
since passage of IBBEA.  Section IV discusses how initial (1994-1997) and evolving (1998-2004) state 
interstate branching laws affect out-of-state branch growth in a state’s banking market. Section V presents 
our index of state branching restrictions, while section VI employs that index in empirical analysis on the 




                                                           
5  The branch banking figures are based on author’s calculations using data from the FDIC and the Federal Reserve 
System.  This figure represents domestic branches of domestic commercial-bank banking companies. 
6 H.R. 3505 and S.2856.  The House bill , passed March 2006, contains a section  (401) titled “Easing the 
restrictions on interstate branching and mergers,” which removes remaining restrictions on de novo interstate 
branching and prohibits branching by commercially owned ILCs chartered after October 1, 2003.  The Senate bill, 
passed May 2006, contains no such section.   
7 Before the Committee of Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United states Senate in March 2006.  The 
testimony is available online at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2006/20060301.   4
II.   Historical Background on Interstate Branching and IBBEA 
Interstate branching has been an issue in the U.S. banking system since its inception.  The issue, 
however, did not become controversial until the establishment of the dual banking system during the Civil 
War.  These restrictions on branch banking are frequently attributed to the efforts of small banks and their 
lobbies to stop large banking companies from entering into their markets.
 8 
Prior to the Civil War, interstate banking and branching was traditionally a state issue, with 
federal law and policy typically deferring to state control.  States historically have had control over 
whether to permit banks chartered under their own chartering authority, state banks chartered by other 
states, and national banking associations, to engage in intrastate and interstate banking and branching.  
With such control, states have prevented both intrastate and interstate banking and branching up until the 
recent past.  As restrictions against interstate banking began to change on a piecemeal basis, Congress 
removed the predominant interstate banking and branching restrictions with the passage of IBBEA, 
subject, however, to a few important limitations. 
With the exception of the Bank of the United States and the Second Bank of the United States, 
chartered by Congress in 1791 and 1816, respectively, the chartering and regulation of banks prior to the 
Civil War was almost entirely a state issue.   These two congressionally chartered banks were much 
different from modern national banking associations, and were chartered essentially to assist the Federal 
government with its banking needs and tax collections.  Both of these banks also had a number of branch 
offices, operating 8 and 27 branches respectively.  Both banks, however, had limited lives; they lost their 
Federal Charters in and 1811 and 1836 respectively.
9  
State chartered banks engaged in limited interstate branch banking prior to the Civil War.   
Although both the form of branch banking and the volume of activities is quite different from today, 
branch banking did occur in several regions.  Limited decentralized interstate branch banking occurred in 
Indiana, Ohio and Iowa.  Although the different branches all shared the same charter, each branch was 
“locally organized, had its own capital subscribed by its own stockholders, and paid its own dividends.”
10  
This model of branching was adopted by state banks in Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Delaware and 
                                                           
8 For this study, we define the term banking company as an independent commercial bank, or a bank holding 
company (BHC), or financial holding company (FHC) that controls one or more commercial banks.   By definition, 
a bank subsidiary of a BHC or FHC is a separately chartered institution controlled through partial or complete 
ownership of its voting stock by a BHC or FHC whereas a branch office, a remote facility of a bank, requires no 
separate charter.  Prior to the establishment of BHCs, however, only independent banks existed.  These retain the 
term “bank”.  A branch office is an office of a financial institution that is physically separated from its home office, 
but that offers the same kinds of deposit taking, loan and other services conducted at the home office.   This study 
examines only domestic banking companies.   
9 For a discussion of the Bank of the United States and the Second Bank of the United States, see Peter S. Rose, 
Banking Across State Lines:  Public and Private Consequences  25 (Quorum 1997); Robertson, supra note 4, at 28-
29; Macey, Miller & Carnell, Banking Law & Regulation (2001) 2-8.   5
Vermont.
11  
During this same period, a more centralized system of branch banking (similar to the modern 
system we have today) developed primarily in the south, with branch banking occurring in Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Missouri.
12   These branches, as opposed to those in the Midwest, 
relied much more on capital raised in the head offices.
13  This model was in substance much closer to 
interstate banking than to interstate branching. 
The ability to engage in interstate branching and banking was never as popular or considered to 
be as important prior to the Civil War as it is today.  Because of limited interstate travel and 
communication during this era, maintaining interstate branches was difficult if not impossible, with few 
of the efficiencies and economies of scale possible today.  With the advent of the telegraph, telephone and 
better interstate travel, the ability to engage in interstate branching became more desirable.  More 
recently, with advanced data processing, telecommunications, and the internet, combined with growing 
overhead costs, branch banking has become a necessity (and perhaps question of survival) for most large 
bank holding companies. 
State control over banking became an issue during the Civil War as Congress provided for the 
chartering and regulation of national banking associations through the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency.
14  Investors chartered national banks and they began to proliferate.  In 1864, there were 1,089 
state banks and 467 national banks in 1864.  By 1865, however, the numbers had flipped; there were only 
394 state banks and 1294 national banks.
15 
Although the National Bank Act provided directives on the regulation, supervision, and 
examination of national banks, it did not provide direction on the issue of interstate and intrastate 
branching regulation.
16  Because of the absence of statutory guidance, the Comptroller of the Currency 
provided direction.  The Comptroller in 1865 ruled that sections 6 and 8 of the National Banking Act 
prohibited branch banking.
17  Based upon their reading of Section, every Comptroller in office until 1922 
agreed that national banks could not open a bank in more than one location.
18   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Robertson, supra note 4, at 28.  
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 28-29; Macey, Miller & Carnell, supra note 9.   
13 Robertson, supra note 4, at 28. 
14 Act of February 25, 1863 (National Currency Act), ch. 58 (183);  Act of June 3, 1864 (National Bank Act), ch. 
106, (1864).  
15 Eugene Nelson White, The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press (1983) at 12.   
16 Robertson, supra note 4, at 81 (“Examination of the legislative history . . . reveals no special concern about 
branches”). 
17 Id. at 82; Peter S. Rose, supra note 9, at  26-27. 
18 Larry R. Mote, The Perennial Issue: Branch Banking, Business Conditions, Federal Reserve Bank of  Chicago 
(February 1974); Peter S. Rose, Banking Across State Lines:  Public and Private Consequences  27 (Quorum 1997).   6
Likewise, during the next 50 years, there was little if any branching of any kind occurring at the 
state level.  The National Monetary Commission noted in a study commissioned in 1911 that “[u]nder 
none of the state banking laws has there been built up an important system of branch banks.”
19  Most state 
legislatures and regulators, however, resisted permitting interstate branching for several reasons.  First, a 
state regulatory agency received no compensation when an in-state bank branched out of state or when an 
out-of-state bank branched or expanded into their state, which left them reluctant to facilitate interstate 
activity.  Second, state banks often put pressure on regulators to limit entry by larger banks chartered out 
side of the state that may pose competitive problems.
20  Accordingly, few states permitted interstate 
branching.  By 1900, branch banking “accounted for only 2 percent of the resources of American 
commercial banks.”
21   
By the turn of the century, branch banking began on a very small scale.  In the early 1900s, states 
began to permit some in-state branch banking.
22  In 1911, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, New 
York, Rhode Island, Virginia and Washington permitted different degrees of intrastate branch banking.
23   
By 1915, “397 banks maintained branches; of this group, 12 were national banks and 385 were state 
banks.  The 397 institutions operated 785 branches; 832 offices were in the head-office city, and 350 were 
outside the head-office city.”
24 
National banks continued to search for ways to get around the restrictions against branch banking, 
particularly as it became more profitable to do so.  National banks also believed that they were in a 
substantial competitive disadvantage in those situations in which state banks could branch.  In 1922, in an 
attempt to put national banks on a more equal footing with state banks, the OCC, based upon an opinion 
from the Attorney General of the United States, permitted national banks to establish branches within 
their home city (and home city only); provided, however, that a state bank was permitted to operate 
branches within that city.
25  Between 1922 and 1926, national banks established 200 limited service 
branch offices “within their city of location.”
26  State banks and their supporters opposed national-bank 
branching and challenged the Comptroller's ruling.  The opposition eventually came to a head in 1924, 
with the Supreme Court ruling against the Comptroller.
27   
                                                           
19 George E. Barnett, State Banks and Trust Companies Since the Passage of the National-Bank Act (Washington: 
Government Printing Office 1911), at 135. 
20 White, supra note 14, at 14; Robertson, supra note 4, at 100.   
21 Robertson, supra note 4, at 100.    
22 Rollinger, supra note 4, at 190.   
23 Barrett, supra note at 136.  Macey, Miller & Carnell, supra note 9, at 19;  Wilmarth, Arthur E. Jr., Too Big to Fail, 
Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, at 1092. 
24 Robertson, supra note 4, at 100.   
25 Id. at 102. 
26 Id. at 104. 
27 First National Bank in St. Louis, v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640 (1924), aff’g 249 S.W. 619 (Mo S.Ct 1923); Peter S.   7
Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state banking industry, Congress responded in 
1927 by permitting a national bank to branch with the passage of the McFadden Act.
28  The statute first 
provided that a national bank could “retain and operate” any branches that it had as of the date of the 
statute.
29  Second, it stated that if a state bank were converted into, or consolidated with, a national bank, 
it could retain and operate its branches.
30  Third, a national bank could “establish and maintain” new 
branches within the city in which it was located if state banks were permitted under the laws of its state, 
subject to certain population limitations.
31   Although couched in positive statutory language, the effect of 
the McFadden was to limit branch banking.  By inference, branching outside of the city where the 
national bank was situation was prohibited—thus restricting any intrastate and interstate branching.   
Congress gave national banks additional branching authorization six years later.  The Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 allowed nationally chartered banks to branch in the same geographical areas as state-
chartered banks.
32  Although this was intended to place national banks on an equal footing with state 
chartered banks, it instead solidified the dominant position of state regulatory authorities by assigning the 
determination of intrastate branching laws to each state regulatory authority.
33  National Banks were 
permitted to branch wherever state-chartered banks could branch statewide. However, national banks 
could also not branch if state banks had no or limited city or state wide branching rights.
34  
Responding to pressure from state banks after the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, state 
regulation restricted intrastate branching in an attempt to prevent entry and growth of national banks in 
their states.  The McFadden Act was read as to stop interstate branching by national banks.  After only a 
few years, half of the states restricted or prohibited banks from setting up branch offices.  In addition, not 
one state permitted interstate branching.
35  There was some attempt to permit national banks to branch 
nationwide through Federal legislation.  The bill, however, was defeated by the lobbying actions of 
community banks.
36  In contrast to the growth of interstate banking described below, prior to passage of 
IBBEA, the vast majority of states did not permit interstate branching.   
These regulatory constraints on interstate banking and branching spawned the multi-bank holding 
company (MBHC), first formed in the early 1900s.  The MBHC structure opened a loophole in branch-
banking regulations that allowed a layered organizational framework of subsidiary organizations to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Rose, Banking Across State Lines:  Public and Private Consequences  28 (Quorum 1997). 
28 McFadden-Pepper  Act, Feb. 25, 1927, Section 7, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224; Rose, supra note 9, at  28. 
29 McFadden-Pepper Act, Feb. 25, 1927, Section 7, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (Section 5155(a)). 
30 McFadden-Pepper Act, Feb. 25, 1927, Section 6, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (Section 5155(b)). 
31 McFadden-Pepper Act, Feb. 25, 1927, Section 6, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (Section 5155(c) & (d)). 
32 Glass-Steagall Act, Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (codified at 12 USC §36). 
33 Rollinger, supra note 4, at 183. 
34 Rose, supra note 9, at 28.    
35 Id.;  Rollinger, supra note 4, at 183.     8
substitute for a network of physical branch offices.
37  Banks, therefore, used the MBHC organizational 
form to effect interstate operations. Over time, additional restrictions on interstate branching further 
encouraged use of the banking company loophole as a means of geographic expansion, leading more 
banks to convert to a banking company structure.  The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 sought to 
constrain the growth of the banking companies specifically through the Douglas Amendment,
38 which 
prohibited acquisition by a banking company of an out-of-state bank or banking company unless 
statutorily authorized by the state in which the target resides.  The Bank Holding Company Act did not 
apply to one-bank bank holding companies (banking companies) and it was amended in 1970 to give the 
Federal Reserve authority over formation and regulation of the one-bank bank holding companies.  This 
regulation was intended to further restrict the operations, organizational form and expansion ability of the 
bank holding companies.   
Despite branch banking prohibitions by state law, Federal law allowed some minor opportunities 
for interstate branch banking.  One such opportunity for geographic bank expansion, through the BHC 
structure, was created with the 1982 Garn-St Germain Act.  A provision of this Act authorized federal 
banking agencies to arrange interstate acquisitions for failed banks with total assets of $500 million or 
more.
39   This policy innovation allowed interstate acquisitions under special circumstances even when 
such acquisitions were not in accordance with state law. Because Federal savings and loan institutions had 
been permitted to branch since 1933,
40 banks welcomed the opportunity to acquire failed savings and loan 
companies and their branch networks during the savings and loan crisis. 
A national bank could also create an interstate branch through moving their main office to a 
different state, leaving the former location as a branch of the new home office.
41  The only limitation was 
that the new office be located not more than 30 miles from the limits of the “city, town or village” where 
the main office was previously located.
42  Although such a method of branching was possible, it was 
limited to national banks located near state borders. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
36 Rollinger, supra note 4, at 192;  Wilmarth, supra note 23, at 973-74.   
37 By definition, a subsidiary is a separately chartered institution controlled through partial or complete ownership of 
its voting stock by a Multibank Holding Company (MBHC), whereas a branch office, a remote facility of a bank, 
requires no separate charter. 
38 Bank Holding Act of 1956, Public Law 511, 84 Cong. Ch. 240, May 9, 1956, 70 Stat. 133, Section 3(d) (the 
Douglas Amendment).  
39 12 USC 1823(f)(4)(B). 
40 Harding de C. Williams, Federal Banking Law and Regulation:  A Handbook for Lawyers  102 (2006). 
41 Id. at 102-103;  Barton Crockett, BankAmerica Will Merge Washington and Idaho Units Using  Thirty-Mile Rule, 
The American Banker, Aug. 23, 1995. 
42 12 USC 30; see also Ramapo Bank v Camp, 425 F.2d 333 (3
rd Cir. 1970); OCC, Interpretations- Corporate 
Decision #96-40 (Aug. 2, 1996); National Bank Allowed To Relocate Main Office And Retain Former Main Office 
As A Branch, 88 Banking L.J. 704 (1971).     9
Although interstate branching was severely restricted, over time individual state laws permitted 
the geographic expansion of commercial banks through interstate banking.
43  Such laws had been relaxed 
prior to IBBEA for 49 of the 50 states (plus the District of Columbia) for a variety of reasons: piecemeal 
changes in legislation, outside events and competition among regulators.  All states except Hawaii 
permitted some type of interstate banking operations either on a reciprocal or nonreciprocal basis.
44  
Regional pacts allowed out-of-state bank entry only from a specific geographic region, including the 
Northeast, the West, the South (often including the Mid-Atlantic states) and the Midwest.
45 
By 1994, while most states allowed interstate banking in some form, only eight states allowed 
any form of interstate branching.
46  Of those eight, six allowed interstate branching only on a national 
reciprocal basis.  Any state wishing to allow its banks to branch into one of those six states must also 
allow the banks headquartered in the six states to branch into their own state.  One state, Nevada, allowed 
interstate branching on a very limited, but nonreciprocal basis.  It permitted interstate branching into 
counties with a population less than 100,000.  Utah was the only state that allowed national nonreciprocal 
interstate branching before IBBEA, and it did so for just three years (as of July 1991) before IBBEA was 
passed.  Even though these rules were on the books, there was almost no interstate branch banking prior 
to the passage of IBBEA in 1995.   
Thus, very few banking organizations had an opportunity to branch across state lines due to the 
preexisting legislation, and were restricted to expansion through only two means: (1) chartering a 
subsidiary in the desired state (called a "de novo bank entry")
47, or (2) acquiring an out-of-state bank to 
convert to a subsidiary of the parent bank.   
This changed dramatically with passage of IBBEA, which allows banks to expand though its 
repeal of interstate banking and branching restrictions (subject, however, to the permitted state provisions 
discussed below).  The repeal of restrictions allows banking companies to merge either subsidiary or 
branch banks across state lines in four ways:  
(1) Interstate bank acquisitions (acquisitions of separately chartered institutions),  
(2) Interstate agency operations (allows a bank subsidiary of a banking company to act as an 
                                                           
43 For a discussion of interstate banking, see Macey, Miller & Carnell, supra note 9, at  26-27, 32-33;  Douglas 
Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 Hofstra Law Review 1133 (1981). 
44 H.R. Rep. 103-448, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039, 1994 WL 96120 (Leg. Hist.), at 2044. 
45 See Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (upholding regional pacts); H. Rodgin Cohen, 
State Interstate Banking Legislation, 597 PLI/Corp 375 (1988); Arnold G.  Danielson, Tenth Anniversary of 
Interstate Banking: The Southern Experience, 11 No. 9 Banking Pol’y Rep. 4 (May 4, 1992); Interstate Banking’s 
Tenth Anniversary:  The Midwest Experience, 11 No. 14 Banking Pol’y Rep. 6 (July 20, 1992). 
46 Dean Amel, State Laws Affecting Geographic Expansion of Commercial Banks, unpublished manuscript, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1993).  Those states are: Alaska, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Nevada, North Carolina and Utah.   
47 A de novo bank is a newly chartered bank, as opposed to a bank that has been acquired or merged from an   10
agent of an affiliate of the banking company without being legally considered as a branch of that 
affiliate),  
(3) Interstate branching (consolidation of acquired banks or individual branches into branches of 
the acquiring bank),  
(4) De novo branching (establishment of a new branch office of a banking company across state 
lines, into states which have passed a statute expressly allowing it.).
48 
 
Thus, the watershed event of IBBEA was not the allowance of interstate banking, but the explicit 
permission of interstate branching.  This gave banking companies the freedom to consolidate bank 
subsidiaries into branch offices and to branch, under the provisions described below, across state lines.   
States could "opt-in" early or "opt-out" of the IBBEA interstate branching provision by passing a 
state law any time between the passage of IBBEA (September 1994) and the trigger date (June 1, 1997).  
"Opting-in" required the state to pass a statute allowing interstate branching prior to June 1997.  This 
provision expressly permitted interstate consolidation and merger transactions prior to June 1, 1997, 
provided that each MBHC or subsidiary involved in the transaction was located in a state which also 
"opted-in" early.  A state that "opted-out" of interstate branching prevented both the state and national 
banks from branching across its borders.  The provision, however, did not give banks complete freedom 
to branch out of state.  As discussed, from the time of enactment until the branching "trigger date" of June 
1, 1997, IBBEA allowed states to determine many details related to this provision.  Most states, in fact, 
used this provision to impose conditions on the entry of out-of-state banks. 
Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have opted into interstate branching, there 
was considerable debate and activity in many states over whether their state should opt out of interstate 
branching.  The pressure to opt out of interstate branching under IBBEA was based on the small bank 
versus big bank special interest issues that had thwarted interstate branching in the past.
49  Some argued 
that interstate branching might imperil smaller communities by siphoning deposits out of the towns and 
using them to make loans to larger clients in financial centers elsewhere.
50 
States that debated opting out included Texas, Colorado, Missouri, Oklahoma, Montana, New 
Mexico, Nebraska and Kansas,
51 with Texas and Montana opting out initially, though they later opted 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
existing institution. 
48 Edward J. Kane, De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now? Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28 No. 2 
(May 1996). 
49 Joseph D. Hutnyan, States Start Considering Whether or When to Opt for Interstate Branching, 14 No. 5 Banking 
Pol’y Rep. 7 (March 6, 1995); Carter H. Golembe, History Offers Some Clues on Signficancce of Interstate 
Branching, 13 No. 15 Banking Pol’y Rep. 4 (Aug 15, 1994). 
50 Barbara F. Bronstien, Opt-Out Pitch: Branching Imperials Small Towns, The American Banker, August 25, 1995. 
51 Terrence O’Hara, Circling the Wagons to Fend Off  Branching, The American Banker, Feb. 15, 1995; Barbara F.   11
in.
52  The Colorado legislature also initially opted out, but the Governor later vetoed the legislation.
53  
Lobbyists for smaller banks such as the Independent Bankers Association of America, the California 
Independent Bankers and the Independent Bankers Association of Texas all lobbied extensively to 
persuade states to opt-out of interstate branching.
54  We discuss in greater detail below the provisions 
determined by Federal law and by the individual states.   
 
III.  IBBEA Interstate Banking and Branching Provisions Determined by Federal Law 
The fundamental regulatory paradigm for interstate banking and branching changed dramatically 
with the passage of IBBEA.  The statute is effectively divided into two portions.  Section 101 of IBBEA 
deals with interstate banking while Sections 102 and 103 deals with interstate branching as summarized 
below.   
 
A.  IBBEA Provisions with regard to Interstate Banking 
IBBEA allowed interstate bank acquisitions after September 29, 1995, and repealed the Douglas 
Amendment of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act.
55  It expressly permits the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (the “Board”) to approve interstate bank acquisitions, regardless of whether 
such acquisition would have been permitted under “the law of any state.”  Unlike the interstate branching 
provisions discussed below, the states were not permitted to opt out of the interstate banking rules.   
IBBEA does impose certain Federal level restrictions on interstate banking.  First, the bank 
holding company acquiring the bank must be “adequately capitalized” and “adequately managed.”
56  
Second, the bank holding company after the acquisition may not exceed a nationwide deposit 
concentration limitation of “more than 10 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository 
institutions in the United States.”
57  Third, the bank holding company may not exceed a statewide deposit 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bronstein, Focus on Kansas, The American Banker (Aug. 25, 1995) ; Barbara F. Bronstien, Iowa Group’s Departing 
President Says “No” to Interstate Branching, The American Banker (July 21, 1995); Setback Puts Oklahoma Foes of 
Interstate on Defensive,  The American Banker, March 22, 1995; Terrence O’Hara, a Colorado Thumbs down for 
Branching, The American Banker, Feb. 24, 1995. 
52 Terrence O’Hara, Texas Governor to Sign Bill Letting State Opt Out of Branching Law, The American Banker, 
April 28, 1995. 
53 Terrence O’Hara, Colorado Governor’s Refusal to Slam Door to Out-of-State Banks Leads to Compromise, The 
American Banker, April 25, 1995. 
54 Hutnyan, supra note 49; Christopher Rhoads, Trade Group Wars, The American Banker (Sept. 21, 1995); 
Terrence O’Hara, A Arsenal of Opt Out:  $250,000 of Ammo from the IBAA, The American Banker, Feb. 15, 1995. 
55 IBBEA, Section 101. 
56 IBBEA, Section 101(a), codified at 12 USC §1842(d)(1)(A). 
57 IBBEA, Section 101, codified at 12 USC §1842(d)(2)(A).  The 10 percent limitation has already become 
problematic for some bank holding companies.  For example, Bank of America has already reached that limit after 
its acquisition of FleetBoston.  Effectively Bank of America will longer be unable to grow through the acquisition of 
additional banks.  Instead, Bank of America will need to grow its deposit base internally.  Order of the Board of   12
concentration limitation, after the acquisition, of more than 30 percent.
58  IBBEA, however, did not affect 
the right of a state to impose a deposit cap that would limit the amount of deposits below 30 percent.
59   
In addition to preserving state deposit cap limitations, IBBEA also preserved state age laws, 
subject to an important exception.  An acquisition is not permitted if it does not does not comply with a 
state’s age law that limits acquisitions of a “bank that has been in existence for a minimum period of 
time” provided that the minimum age does not exceed five years.
60  IBBEA also does not affect the 
Board’s right to take into account the applicability of a state’s community reinvestment laws
61 or a state’s 
antitrust laws.
62  In addition, IBBEA does not affect a state’s authority to tax the bank, the bank holding 
company and any affiliates of a bank.
63  Even given these limitations, the overall effect of IBBEA on 
interstate banking was to eliminate the last vestiges of state interstate banking restrictions.    
 
B.  IBBEA provisions with regard to Interstate Branching 
IBBEA permits a national or state bank to engage in interstate branching, subject to certain 
limitations.  Essentially a bank may engage in interstate branching by (i) purchasing an out-of-state bank 
and converting that bank into a branch, or (ii) subject to state banking law, either purchase the branch of 
an out-of-state bank or open a “do novo” branch in a state other than its home state. As discussed above, 
IBBEA did permit a state to “opt-out” of interstate branching and also to “opt-in” early.  Finally, IBBEA 
preserved a state’s deposit cap and minimum age laws with respect to interstate branching. 
 
Interstate Bank Mergers.  Beginning June 1, 1997, IBBEA permits a merger between insured 
banks with different home states, without regard to whether such transaction is prohibited under the law 
of any State.
64  As part of the merger transaction, one bank would essentially be converted into an out-of-
state branch or branches of the surviving bank.  IBBEA also permits, subject to state law, a bank to 
acquire an out-of-state branch and substantively merge it into the bank.
65   
Although IBBEA was intended to apply to all states, it did permit a state to “expressly” prohibit 
all “merger transactions involving out-of-state banks,”
66 effectively preventing interstate branching for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Order Approving the Merger of Bank Holdings Companies (Bank of 
America Corporation – FleetBoston Financial Corporation), March 8, 2004. 
58 IBBEA, Section 101, codified at 12 USC §1842(d)(2)(B). 
59 IBBEA, Section 101, codified at 12 USC §1842(d)(2)(C). 
60 IBBEA, Section 101(a), codified at 12 USC §1842(d)(1)(B). 
61 IBBEA, Section 101(a), codified at 12 USC § 1842(d)(3). 
62 IBBEA, Section 101(a), codified at 12 USC §1842(d)(4). 
63 IBBEA, Section 101(b), codified at 12 USC §1846(b). 
64 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(a)(1). 
65 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(a)(4). 
66 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(a)(2).   13
that state.  This was commonly referred to as a bank’s ability to “opt-out” of interstate branching.  The 
only requirements were that a state had (i) to opt-out of interstate branching after the enactment date of 
IBBEA (September 29, 1994) and before June 1, 1997 and (ii) it had to apply “equally to all out-of-state 
banks.”
67  Only Texas and Montana elected to opt-out of interstate branching, although both states later 
opted back in.  IBBEA also permitted a state to “opt-in” early to interstate branching.  An interstate 
merger transaction (that resulted in out-of-state branches) could occur prior to June 1, 1997, provided that 
the state had enacted a statute permitting such transaction.
68   
IBBEA imposes several Federal level limitations on interstate branching.  First, both banks must 
be adequately capitalized prior to the merger transaction and the resulting bank after the merger must also 
be “adequately capitalized” and “adequately managed.”
69  Second, the resulting bank after the merger 
may not exceed a nationwide deposit concentration limitation of “more than 10 percent of the total 
amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States.”
70  Third, for other than initial 
entries, the resulting bank may not control 30 percent or more of the deposits in either its home state or in 
any of its out-of-state branches host states, although a state is permitted to decrease or increase that 
percentage as will be discussed below.
71  
 
C.   IBBEA Branching Provisions Determined by Individual States 
While IBBEA opened the doors to nationwide branching, it allowed the states to have 
considerable influence in the manner in which it was implemented, permitting states to effectively impose 
anticompetitive obstacles to interstate branching.    It gave states the ability to set regulations on interstate 
branching with regard to four important provisions:  (1) the minimum age of the target institution to be 
acquired and then merged into the acquirer, (2) de novo interstate branching, (3) acquisition of individual 
branches, and (4) statewide deposit cap.    IBBEA does also not limit a state’s ability to apply reciprocity 
conditions on those wanting to branch into the state.  Over the past decade, some states have been 
relaxing those restrictions.   
 
Minimum Age of Target Institution 
Although IBBEA expressly permits interstate branching through interstate bank mergers, IBBEA 
preserves state age laws with respect to such acquisitions.  Under IBBEA, states are allowed to set their 
                                                           
67 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(b)(2).   
68 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(b)(3). 
69 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC§1831u(b)(4). 
70 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(b)(2)(A).  The 10 percent limitation has already become 
problematic for some bank holding companies.  See note 58.   
71 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(b)(2)(B).     14
own minimum age requirements with respect to how long a bank has been in existence prior to its 
acquisition in an interstate bank merger.
72  The state law, however, cannot impose an age requirement of 
more than five years.
73   
This rule applies to all banks, whether they are chartered by a state regulatory agency or the OCC.  
If a newly established subsidiary office is located in a state which mandates a minimum age requirement, 
then the banking company must wait to consolidate the subsidiary to a branch until the subsidiary has met 
the necessary age requirement.     
Many states set their age requirement at five years, but several states implemented a lower state 
age requirement (three years or less) or required no minimum age limit at all.   The age requirement of the 
subsidiary office restricts entry of out-of-state banks that wish to establish branch offices, or slows 
consolidation for banking companies with newly established subsidiaries located in states with such 
requirements. 
An age requirement serves two important functions for a state banking industry.  First, it protects 
older and established banks in the state.  To branch into a state with an age requirement, the only mode of 
entry is to buy an older institution and merge it into the bank.  Second, it imposes significant costs on out-
of-state entry.  Rather than simply opening a de novo branch office, a bank is required to purchase an 
entire operating bank to enter a state.  Separate bank charters are presumably more costly than a branch 
office because they require separate charters, management, capital, and Board of Directors.   
 
De novo Interstate Branching 
While interstate branching done through an interstate bank merger (i.e. the purchase and 
conversion of an existing bank to a branch office) is now permitted in every state, de novo interstate 
branching is only permitted under IBBEA if a state explicitly “opts-in” to this provision; that is, a bank is 
allowed to open an interstate branch if state law expressly permits it to do so.
74 
This provision applies only to initial entry, though this is not stated in many of the statutes.  This 
implies that, if a bank is able to enter a state through a loophole and establish one initial out-of-state 
branch, it may then open other branches in that state.  We discuss this important distinction and its 
implications below. 
De novo branching allows a bank to branch interstate without the costs of purchasing an 
operating bank, discussed above.  A de novo branching rule benefits all banking companies wishing to 
                                                           
72 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(a)(5)(A). 
73 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1231u(a)(5)(B). 
74 IBBEA, Section 103, codified at12 USC §36(g) (national banks and state member banks pursuant to 12 USC 
§321) and 12 USC §1828(d).   15
enter a state; but small banking companies may benefit more than large banking companies, since they 
may be less able acquire an existing bank than to open a branch office.   
 
Acquisition of Single Branches or Other Portions of an Institution  
IBBEA states that an interstate merger transaction may involve the acquisition of a branch (or 
number of branches) of a bank without the acquisition of the entire bank itself only if the state in which 
the branch is located permits such a purchase.
75  Again, states must explicitly “opt-in” to this provision.  
In enacting such a provision, many states also subject a branch acquisition to an age requirement. 
Such a provision makes it less costly and more efficient for a bank to engage in interstate 
branching.  Rather than being required to enter into an interstate merger of an entire bank in order to 
interstate branch, a bank may now choose those interstate branches that it wishes to acquire.  For 
example, an Indiana bank wanting to interstate branch into Illinois may only want to acquire the Chicago 
branches of an Illinois bank as opposed to acquiring the Peoria branches as well.     
 
Statewide Deposit Cap   
Under IBBEA, an interstate merger (other than with respect to initial entry) will not be approved 
if the resulting bank (including any affiliated insured depository institutions) controlled 30 percent or 
more of the insured deposits in the state.
76   This limitation, however, is not to be construed to affect a 
state’s authority to limit the percentage of deposits that may be controlled by a bank or holding 
company.
77  IBBEA preserves the right of a state to impose a deposit cap on an interstate bank merger 
transaction below 30 percent and also to impose limitations with respect to initial entry.  The provision 
should also be read to preserve a state’s right to permit deposit concentration levels to exceed 30 percent. 
The obvious impact of a deposit concentration limitation would be to prevent a bank from 
entering into a larger interstate merger in such state.  For example, if a state had set a deposit cap of 15 
percent, a bank could not enter into an interstate merger transaction with any institution that held more 
than 15 percent of the deposits in that particular state.  A state could also try to encourage interstate 





                                                           
75 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831u(a)(2).   
76 IBBEA, Section 102(a), codified at 12 USC §1831. 
77 IBBEA, Section 102, codified at 12 USC §1831u(b)(2)(C).   16
Reciprocity 
Rather than specifically permitting or prohibiting de novo branching, acquisition of a branch or 
portion of a bank, a set age requirement or deposit cap, many states chose to offer these four provisions 
with reciprocity.  In other words, the state would allow the particular action by an out-of-sate bank so 
long as the laws of the state for that out-of-state bank were reciprocal, permitting the same level of 
interstate branching.  For example, a state could permit de novo entry into its state, provided that the state 
in which the out-of-state bank is either chartered (or headquartered in the case of a national bank) also 
permitted de novo entry into their state. 
 
IV.  States’ Response to Interstate Branching Provisions 
To collect information on each state’s initial IBBEA provisions and changes to those provisions 
between 1994 and 2005, we surveyed individual state statues over the 11 year period.
78  We collected all 
state statutes that address interstate branching and interpreted the provisions, and changes to those 
provisions.
79  We discuss the states’ regulatory actions for each provision in turn below. 
Table 1 details the changes to state interstate branching law. Since the 1997 “trigger date,” 13 
states have eased their initial restrictions on interstate branching.  Those states are: Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Washington and Vermont.  Table 2 lists for 1997 and 2005 the number of states that allowed or prohibited 
each of the four state-determined provisions.  This table shows, generally, that over time, states eased 
their interstate branching restrictions.  Appendix A lists each of the states interstate branching laws from 
1994-2005.   
    
Minimum Age of Target Institution   
As of the 1997 trigger date, 30 states had a five-year minimum age requirement.
80  Five had a 
three-year age requirement, 14 had no age requirement, three of which with an added reciprocity 
condition, and two states (Montana and Texas) opt-ed out.  By year end 2005, 24 states had a five-year 
minimum age requirement, seven had a three-year minimum age requirement, 20 had no age requirement, 
                                                           
78 The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) publishes a  respected “Profile of State-Chartered Banking” 
every two years.  See Conference of State Bank Supervisors,  A Profile of State-Chartered Banking.  Washington, 
DC: The Conference of State Bank Supervisors 2002.  Although the information included on interstate branching is 
useful, it is collected through voluntary surveys to the individual states. The state responses are not uniform, and 
thus could not be used  in our empirical analysis which covers, annually, the 50 states plus the District of Columbia 
over the 11 year period studied.  
79 We also contacted the individual state regulatory agencies when we found discrepancies, ambiguities or omissions 
in the state statutes. 
80 Oregon’s law (passed prior to the trigger date) was effective 07/01/1997.  One state (Arizona) had a 5 year   17
six of which with reciprocity requirements.  Most of the states that changed their statutes over the time 
period generally moved from a five year requirement to no age requirement.  One state, Indiana, added a 
minimum age requirement.  In 1997, it had no age requirement, but added a five year age requirement in 
1998. 
 
Statewide Deposit Cap on Branch Acquisition 
In 1997, 33 states plus the District of Columbia imposed a 30 percent statewide deposit cap, the 
standard set by IBBEA.  Some states enacted legislation that explicitly enacted a state-wide deposit cap of 
30 percent, while some states were silent on the deposit cap, in which case, the IBBEA state-wide cap 
applies.  11 states imposed a statewide deposit cap less than 30 percent; more restrictive than IBBEA 
dictates.  Two states chose statewide deposit caps greater than 30 percent, and two states expressly 
imposed no deposit cap.  Only three states made changes to their statewide deposit caps over time; all 
increased the cap. 
 
De novo Interstate Branching   
As of 1997, 12 states and the District of Columbia allowed de novo branching.  Of those, eight 
states allowed it with reciprocity, 36 states prohibited de novo branching, and two (Montana and Texas) 
opted-out.  By year end 2005, 22 states plus the District of Columbia allowed de novo branching, 16 of 
the 22 states allowed it with reciprocity, and 28 states prohibited de novo branching.  States that made 
changes moved from prohibiting de novo branching to either allowing it unrestricted or with reciprocity.  
All states that made changes over the time period eased restrictions. 
 
Acquisition of Single Branches or Other Portions of an Institution   
In 1997, 31 states prohibited acquisition of a branch or a portion of a bank.  18 states allowed it; 
10 states plus the District of Columbia allowed unrestricted and seven states allowed it with reciprocity.  
Again, the two states of Montana and Texas opted-out.  By year end 2005, 24 states, 7 fewer than in 1997, 
prohibited acquisition of branches or a portion of a bank.  27 allowed it, 13 unrestricted and 14 with 
reciprocity.  All states that changed restrictions over time eased those restrictions.   
 
 Reciprocity 
By the end of 2005, 16 states allowed de novo branching with reciprocity.  This means that an 
out-of-state bank could enter into one of those 16 states through de novo branching as long as their home 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
minimum age requirement with reciprocity.     18
state also allowed it.   Over time, the number of states permitting de novo branching or acquisition of a 
branch or portion of a bank with reciprocity increased. 
 
V.   Description of State Branching-Restriction Index 
Using our information on state branching statutes, we create quantitative measures to assess the 
relative restrictiveness of the state interstate branching law post-IBBEA.  We do this in two ways.  First, 
we assign a value of one for each factor to the states which set more restrictive provisions than those set 
by IBBEA for each of the provisions discussed above (minimum age for acquisition, de novo interstate 
branching, interstate branching by acquisition of a single branch or other portions of an institution, and 
statewide deposit cap).   
Since states had to explicitly enact legislation if they chose to deviate from the interstate 
branching provisions outlined in IBBEA (in Section III.b.), we implicitly assume that IBBEA is the 
benchmark.  We, therefore, define the state restriction variables as follows: Deposit Cap equals 1 if a state 
enacted deposit cap of 30 percent or less; otherwise Deposit Cap equals zero.   Minimum Age equals 1 if a 
state enacted a 3 or 5 year minimum age for acquisition requirement, otherwise, it equals zero.  De Novo 
Branching equals 1 if a state prohibits it, otherwise it equals zero.  Single Branch Acquisition equals 1 if a 
state prohibits it, otherwise it equals zero. 
Reciprocity equals 1 if the state instituted a reciprocity condition, otherwise it equals zero.  It is 
not evident how the reciprocity condition affects out-of-state branch growth.  Generally, states that 
imposed a reciprocity condition were more open (less restrictive) with regard to interstate branch 
regulation.  These states had lower barriers to entry than some others, yet banks in states that wished to 
open branching in states with reciprocity had to be equally open.   
We also create an index to proxy for a restrictive interstate branching regulatory environment.  
We aggregate the four factors, to give a value for the index between zero and four, with zero being the 
least restrictive and four being the most restrictive.  Our index is equally weighted between the four 
factors.  Since we have collected the information on state statutes and changes to those statutes since 
1994, we have a dynamic index that changes over time.   
 
VI.   Data and Analysis 
Data 
Our data set consists of all banking companies that existed from 1994 (the year in which IBBEA 
was enacted) through 2005.  For each banking company, we also include its subsidiary bank and branch 
data.  The parent bank holding company consolidated financial data are collected from the Federal   19
Reserve Board's FR Y-9C reports.  The bank-specific financial data are taken from the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council's Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (call reports).  The 
branch data come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Summary of Deposits data.   
The three data sets are merged by the top-tier entity (be it a bank or bank holding company), with 
one observation for each bank and branch office owned by that top-tier entity.  We then aggregate the 
banking company information for each state and construct a panel set where each state plus the District of 
Columbia has one observation per year for the entire sample period.  The resulting panel has 612 
observations.  Finally, to this set, we add the state interstate branching variables representing each of the 
four state provisions, the reciprocity condition and our state restriction index.   
 
 Empirical  Analysis 
Table 3 contains the summary statistics of our variables for the years 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2005.   
The table shows that the restriction index has declined over time.  This decline is consistent with Table 2 
which shows that over time the state laws became, on average, less restrictive.  The increasing number of 
out-of-state branch offices and the proportion of out-of-state branches to total branches is consistent with 
our hypothesis that as state regulations became less restrictive, more out-of-state branches would emerge.   
The table suggests that the restrictive post-IBBEA state interstate branching laws may be 
negatively associated with growth of out-of-state branches.  We test this hypothesis within a simple 
framework.  Namely, we wish to examine whether these provisions, when more restrictive than the 
provisions set by either IBBEA or neighboring states individually have affected the growth of out-of-state 
branches between 1994 and 2005.  We, therefore, model out-of-state branches at the state level as a 
function of these four state restrictions, which limits competition from out-of-state banks, and a number 
of controls. 
The general form of the model is: 
Out-of-state branchesit =  ai  + ß1it* state restrictions + ß2it*reciprocity +  ei, (1)   
   where the dependent variable, out-of-state branches, is the number of out-of-state branches to 
total branches, state restrictions is, alternatively, each of the state branching variables or our interstate 
branching index, reciprocity is an indicator variable for whether the states imposed a reciprocity 
condition, i indexes the 50 states plus the District of Columbia and t indexes the years 1994-2005.
81  We 
include reciprocity because this condition directly affects whether the provision itself applies uniformly to 
all out-of-state banks wishing to establish branch offices in a particular state.    
                                                           
81 This regression model is used to evaluate the linear relationship between the out-of-state branch growth (the 
dependent variable) and the individual state restriction variables (the explanatory variables), the regression 
coefficients are represented by a (the intercept) and B1 and B2.     20
Table 4 contains our regression results.  Our model is estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) techniques with state and time fixed effects.   The superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  The regression R-squared 
statistics are included in the last row.  The R-squared statistics for the 5 alternative regression 
specifications, listed in Table 4, range between 0.29 and 0.32.   
Each of the columns 1-4 includes one of the four provisions, time and state fixed effects, a 
constant term and the reciprocity indicator variable.  Column 5 contains regression results using the 
restriction index, the sum of the four provisions, time and state fixed effects, a constant term and the 
reciprocity indicator variable.     
Our initial empirical results support our hypothesis.  If higher interstate branching restrictions 
were associated with fewer out-of-state branches then we would expect the coefficients (the ß1 estimates 
of the dependent variables) to be negative and statistically significant.  Our results indicate that two of the 
four provisions are statistically significant (acquisition of single branches at the 5 percent level and the 
statewide deposit cap at the 1 percent level).  From this result we infer that these two provisions, 
specifically, adversely affect out-of-state branch growth in states by prohibiting acquisition of single 
branches and by having a lower statewide deposit cap.  The estimated coefficients for de novo branching 
and the minimum age requirement are not statistically significant, which suggests that these two 
restrictions are not binding constraints; that is, banking companies were either able to circumvent the 
minimum age requirement and prohibition on de novo branching or that the other restrictions were more 
binding than these two restrictions.   
The coefficient on the restriction index is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, suggesting that as a whole, the four provisions together, when more restrictive than the provisions 
set by either IBBEA or neighboring states resulted in fewer out-of-state branches in those states.  The 
coefficient on reciprocity is not significant, suggesting that this condition did not affect out-of-state 
branch growth.    
 
VII. Summary and Conclusion 
When implemented, it appeared that IBBEA allowed unrestricted interstate branching across all 
states.  But, in fact, it allowed states to create barriers to out-of-state branch entry.  This study identifies 
these restrictions and provides initial evidence that the provisions affected out-of-state branch growth.   
We conclude that two of the four provisions granted the states by IBBEA (the state-wide deposit 
cap and prohibition on the acquisition of single branches) restricted out-of-state branch growth when 
those provisions were more restrictive than the provisions set by either IBBEA or neighboring states.  We   21
find, however, that the minimum age requirement and de novo interstate branching did not materially 
affect out-of-state branch growth.  It is likely that banks were simply able to circumvent these restrictions 
or that the other two provisions were more restrictive, or constraining, to out-of-state branch growth.   
Our results suggest that the elimination of remaining interstate branching restrictions would likely 
result in increased out-of-state branch growth by lowering the barriers (or costs) for out-of-state banks to 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The state restriction variables are defined as follows: Deposit Cap equals 1 if a state enacted deposit cap of 30 
percent or less; otherwise Deposit Cap equals 0.   Minimum Age equals 1 if a state enacted 3 or 5 year minimum 
age for acquisition requirement, otherwise, it equals 0.  De Novo Branching equals 1 if a state prohibits it, otherwise 
it equals 0.  Single Branch Acquisition equals 1 if a state prohibits it, else 0, and finally, Reciprocity equals 1 if the 
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Table 4 
Regression Results 
Regression results for balance panel (N=612) of 50 states plus District of Columbia, aggregated from bank/branch 
level data, 1994-2005.  The dependent variable equals the number of out-of-state branches to total branches.  All 
variables are based on annual observations from year t.  Equations are estimated with fixed time and state effects.  The 
superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
T-statistics are included in parentheses. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Acquisition of  
single branches 
-0.0460** 
(-2.26)      
 
Allows de novo 
branches   
-0.0242 
(-1.19)     
 
Minimum age 
requirement    
-0.0046 
(-0.23)    
 
Statewide  
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